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COMMENT
THE WASHINGTON LAW OF ARREST WITHOUT
WARRANT-INCIDENTAL SEARCH
The scope of this comment is limited to considerations of the sub-
stantive law of arrest without a warrant and the permissible scope of
searches and seizures incidental thereto. The discussion of substan-
tive requirements for arrest without warrant and its incidental search
will be confined to present Washington case law as measured against
the federal constitutional and common law backgrounds.
Only cursory comments will be made on the substantive require-
ments regarding warrants; the treatment of warrants will be limited
to those situations in which the court has equated the requirements for
arrest without warrants with the requirements for the issuance of a
warrant. Arrests by private citizens will not be treated since they
either rarely occur or are seldom litigated. No attempt will be made
to discuss the pros and cons of the "exclusionary rule" as this has been
quite ably done elsewhere.1
ARREST2 WITHOUT WARRANT BY PEACE OFFICER8
The common law reflected an attempt to balance the conflicting
'Pro: See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885) ; People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 454, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
See also GLUECK, CRInM AND JusTICE 64-75 (1945) ; Comment, Judicial Control of
Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1948). Con: 8 WIGMORE, EVMENcE §
2264 (1961). See State v. Rousseau, 40 Wn.2d 92, 97, 241 P2d 447, 450 (1952) (con-
curring opinion). See generally, Morris, The End of an Experiment in Federalism-
a Note on Mapp v. Ohio, p. 407 supra.
2The RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §§ 112-17 (1934) [hereinafter cited RESTATEMENT]
will be relied upon for the general definition of terms in the discussion of the law of
arrest. Where applicable, the Washington court's definitions will be used.
ARREST. "The taking of another into the custody of the actor for the actual or
purported purpose of bringing the other before a court, or otherwise securing the
administration of the law." RESTATEMENT § 112. Arrest usually involves restriction
of freedom of the arrested person, i.e., an imprisonment. "Thus, while most arrests
involve a confinement, some do not, as where the actor takes one into custody by a
mere touching while serving a valid warant." 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 3.18 at 275
(1956) [hereinafter cited HARPER & JAMES]. The Washington court has defined im-
prisonment as, "any exercise of force, or express or implied threat of force, by which
in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty, compelled to remain where he does
not wish to remain or to go where he does not wish to go, is an imprisonment." Harris
v. Stanioch, 150 Wash. 380, 384, 273 Pac. 198, 199 (1928), quoting 11 R.C.L. 793
(1916). False imprisonment is then (the unlawful arrest of a person) such an act
without a warrant, or by an illegal warrant, or a warrant illegally executed. Pallet v.
Thompkins, 10 Wn.2d 697, 118 P.2d 190 (1941). But where one voluntarily accom-
panies his accusers for the purpose of proving his innocence there is no imprisonment:
there must be some restraint to make it false imprisonment. James v. MacDougall &
Southwick Co., 134 Wash. 314, 235 Pac. 812 (1925).
3 "A peace officer is a person designated by public authority, whose duty it is t,,
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interests of the individual in his personal liberty and of society in the
apprehension of criminals by limiting the privilege of arrest without
warrant. A distinction was made between the privilege of a private
person and the privilege of a peace officer to arrest without warrant.'
A further distinction was made on the basis of whether the arrest was
for a felony5 or for a misdemeanor' amounting to a breach of the
peace.7 At the common law, a private individual could arrest without
warrant, if (1) the felony for which he arrested had actually been
committed; and (2) he reasonably believed the arrested person had
committed it; or (3) if the arrested person had attempted to commit
a felony in the private citizen's presence and the arrest was made at
once or upon fresh pursuit; or (4) if the arrested person was com-
mitting a breach of the peace in the private citizen's presence, or having
so committed, the citizen reasonably believed the breach would be re-
newed.' A private citizen took the risk of liability for false imprison-
ment if a felony had not actually been committed.'
A peace officer, at common law, was privileged to arrest in all
situations in which a private citizen was privileged. The peace officer,
unlike the private citizen, was not liable, even if a felony had not
actually been committed."0 He could arrest if he had reasonable
grounds to suspect a felony had been committed and that the arrested
person had committed it."
In respect to offenses less than felonies, a private citizen's privilege
was very nearly the same as a peace officer's." Both could arrest for
a misdemeanor amounting to a breach of peace committed in their
keep the peace and arrest persons guilty or suspected of crime." RESTATEMENT § 114.
RCW 9.78.040 provides: "For the purposes of this chapter 'peace officer' means a duly
appointed city, county or state law enforcement officer."
1 HARPER & JAMES § 3.18.
5 RCW 9.01.020 states: "Every crime which may be punished by death or by im-
prisonment in the state penitentiary is a felony."
6 The same statute further states: "Every crime punishable by a fine of not more
than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more
than ninety days, is a misdemeanor. Every other crime is a gross misdemeanor."
Where an act is prohibited by statute but no penalty is set out, "the committing of
such act shall be a misdemeanor." RCW 9.01.090.
7 "A breach of the peace is a public offense done by violence or one causing or
likely to cause an immediate disturbance of public order." RESTATEMENT § 116. The
Washington court has said breach of the peace is a "generic term, and includes all
violations of the public peace or order calculated to disturb the public tranquility...."
Smith v. Drew, 175 Wash. 11, 16, 26 P.2d 1040, 1043 (1933). See also, RESTATEMENT
§§ 119-121 ; 1 HARPER & JAMES § 3.18.
8 RESTATEMENT §§ 119-21; 1 HARPER & JAMES § 3.18.
9 1 HARPER & JAMES § 3.18; RESTATEMENT § 119, comment i.
16 1 HARPER & JAMES § 3.18.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. See Smith v. Drew, 175 Wash. 11, 26 P.2d 1040 (1933).
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presence, "if the arrest is made immediately or in prompt and unbroken
pursuit, and in no other cases."'" A peace officer, however, could arrest
all those who apparently had participated in a riot or affray in his
presence even though some might be innocent. 4 The private citizen
was not so privileged. The privilege to arrest in such a situation was
extended to a peace officer because the performance of his duty to
preserve the peace would be impaired unless he was given wide dis-
cretion in performance of his duty and protected from liability should
he make an honest and reasonable mistake. 5
With this brief background of common law standards, attention can
now be focused on the Washington law of arrest without warrant by
a peace officer.
MISDE EANoR ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT
Probably the most significant change in the common law of arrest
made by the Washington court is in the area of arrest for misde,
meanors. In State v. Hughlett 6 the court said:
In misdemeanor cases the officer may not arrest without a warrant
therefor, except where the crime is being committed in his presence, or
where he had actual knowledge that the person about to be arrested
committed the crime.' 7 (Emphasis added.)
The next year the court in Coles v. McNamara,8 a false imprison-
ment action involving the privilege of an officer to arrest the plaintiff
for a misdemeanor, said that it was up to the jury to decide:
Whether appellent McNamara had reasonable grounds to believe, and
did believe, that a violation of the law was being committed in his
presence for which he had a right to arrest respondent .... " (Emphasis
added.)
Following these decisions came State v. Deitz, ° in which the court
held that "even though the misdemeanor committed in the presence
of an officer be not a breach of the peace, nevertheless the right to
arrest exists."'" Thus the Washington court abrogated the require-
ment of "breach of the peace" and provided a defense of "reasonable
13 1 HARP R & JAms § 3.18, at 281.
1" Ibid. RFSTATEMENT § 121, comment J.
15 1 HAPER & JAmES § 3.18; RESTATEM NT § 121, comments g and j.
16124 Wash. 366, 214 Pac. 841 (1923).
17 Id. at 368, 214 Pac. at 842.
18 131 Wash. 377, 230 Pac. 430 (1924).
29 Id. at 384, 230 Pac. at 432.
20 136 Wash. 228, 239 Pac. 386 (1925).
21 Id. at 229, 239 Pac. at 387.
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cause" in misdemeanor cases. These changes retreated from the com-
mon law, for at common law "both an officer and citizen take the risk
that the person arrested is innocent if an arrest is made for an offense
less than a felony .... Il22 In Washington, therefore, the privilege of
arrest exists whenever the peace officer has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that a misdemeanor is being committed in his presence.2"
Breach of the peace retains significance in the situation where a
misdemeanor is not committed in an officer's presence, such as in one's
own home. In that situation an officer is privileged to arrest without
warrant only "if the person is guilty of disorderly conduct therein
such as disturbs the peace and quietude of the general public, or. . . the
neighborhood in which he resides...."24 However, this approach of
the Washington court necessarily highlights two key terms: "probable
cause" and "presence."
PROBABLE CAUSE. Probable cause to believe that a misde-
meanor is being committed in the presence of the officer is essential to
a valid arrest.25 If, however, the officer erroneously, but with probable
cause, believed the arrested person had committed a misdemeanor,
he "... is immune from liability for acting in good faith upon that
belief. . .""
Anonymous information that X is committing a misdemeanor does
not constitute probable cause; but when coupled with information that
officers have obtained to produce an honest and reasonable belief
that the law is being violated, the arrest may be made."
On information supplied by anonymous informers the court has
said:
No faithful and vigilant police officer is justified in closing his ears to
anonymous information and rejecting it without investigation as being
unworthy of his notice. It is the duty of every officer, in enforcing the
law, to listen carefully to all such anonymous information; and, if it is
supported by his prior knowledge of the facts or by subsequently learned
confirmatory facts which reasonably may, and which do, produce in his
mind an honest belief that the law is being violated, then he has reason-
able and probable cause to act, and he should act accordingly, notwith-
22 1 HARPER & JAMES § 3.18 at 283.
- For a more recent application of this development see Sennett v. Zimmerman,
50 Wn.2d 649, 314 P.2d 414 (1957). The whole line of cases developing this doctrine
is criticized in Note, 33 WASH. L. REv. 203 (1958).
24 Ulvestad v. Dolphin, 152 Wash. 580, 589, 278 Pac. 681, 684 (1929).
2 Sennett v. Zimmerman, 50 Wn.2d 649, 314 P.2d 414 (1957).2511d. at 651, 314 P.2d at 416.
2 State v. Zupan, 155 Wash. 80, 283 Pac. 671 (1929) ; State v. Knudsen, 154 Wash.
87, 280 Pac. 922 (1929).
[VOL. 36
ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT
standing the character of the information which first caused him to
investigate.28 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, an anonymous "tip" standing alone would not justify arrest,
but the "tip" that X would be transporting illegal liquor plus knowl-
edge that X was a prior liquor law violator, and the over-loaded con-
dition of the truck did add up to probable cause.23
Similarly, general information that between the hours of eleven and
two an automobile carrying contraband will pass through town is not
sufficient to permit officers to stop cars entering the town so that they
may conduct an investigation. 0 Mere information is not enough. A
fortiori, suspicion is not enough. 1 Therefore, X's arrest was unlawful
where a sheriff merely suspected, but had no knowledge that X had
liquor in his possession (a misdemeanor);s2 but suspicion based on
observation of a prior offender's activities for two days by officers
familiar with the ways of bootleggers was held to be probable cause. 3
PRESENCE. "In the officer's presence" means within the percep-
tion of the officer. It is not enough that a misdemeanor be committed
within the proximity of the officer; he must be aware of its commis-
sion." If the officer "by the use of any of his senses, perceives that
an act is being done, and forthwith investigates and finds that the act
constitutes..."" a misdemeanor (in Washington), he is privileged to
arrest. An officer, however, cannot salvage an unlawful arrest for a
felony by later discovering that the person wrongfully arrested pos-
sessed burglary tools-a misdemeanor. The misdemeanor was not
committed in his presence, because he had no knowledge of their
existence when he made the arrest. 6
SHOPLIFTING: A SPECIAL CASE
In 1959 the Washington legislature codified provisions for arrest
without warrant in the special instance of the gross misdemeanor of
28 State v. Bantam, 163 Wash. 598, 601, 1 P.2d 861, 862 (1931).
29 State v. Knudsen, 154 Wash. 87, 280 Pac. 922 (1929).3 0 Mitchell v. Hughes, 104 Wash. 231, 176 Pac. 26 (1918).
31 See Giacona v. State, 298 S.W.2d 587, 588-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957): "IT]he
arrest of a person upon pure supposition or belief is in violation of both state and
federal constitutional guarantees of freedom from unreasonable arrest"
32 State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922).
33 State v. Dillon, 155 Wash. 486, 284 Pac. 1016 (1930). See also State v. Kittle,
137 Wash. 173, 241 Pac. 962 (1926).
84 R TATEMENT § 119, comment n.
35 Ibid.3 6 State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948). But cf. United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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shoplifting. 7 The legislature provided: "A peace officer may, upon
a charge being made and without a warrant, arrest any person whom
he has reasonable cause to believe has committed or attempted to
commit the crime of shoplifting."3 (Emphasis added.) Another pro-
vision39 makes reasonable cause a defense to a "civil or criminal action
for false arrest, false imprisonment, or wrongful detention against a
peace officer, by a person suspected of shoplifting."4 (Emphasis
added.)
Obviously the statute leaves unanswered the very important ques-
tion-what is reasonable cause? In all probability, however, the court
will rely on its previous definitions of reasonable or "probable cause"
in its interpretation of this statute-the court seemingly uses the
terms interchangeably. Prior to this statute the court held that mere
suspicion or bare information by a third party was not probable
cause." Yet, the statute can certainly be read as making information
alone sufficient grounds for arrest. The provision "upon a charge being
made" read with the defense section which uses the word suspected
could certainly be interpreted as a legislative recognition that the peace
officer will normally only have a charge or information of a third party
upon which to base his suspicion and this suspicion may be reasonable
cause to believe. This construction would further extend the privilege
of arrest in the narrow area of shoplifting.
In false imprisonment actions, whether an officer had probable cause
to arrest is a jury question.42 In a shoplifting case, " just two years
prior to the passage of the statute, a store clerk paid by the store
owner, but deputized as a city police officer, by her own observations
concluded that the plaintiff had shoplifted and arrested him. The
deputized detective appealed from an adverse judgment, asserting that
the trial court had committed error in instructing the jury that the
defendant must prove that the plaintiff actually committed the mis-
demeanor for which he was arrested. The court in holding the instruc-
• RCW 9.78.010-.040. See Morris, Washington Legislation--Criminal Law, 34
WASH. L. REV. 308 (1959).
38 RCW 9.78.020.
39 RCW 9.78.030.
40 Notice that an arrest may involve other torts not provided for in this provision,
e.g., assault, battery, slander.
41 State v. Knudsen, 154 Wash. 87, 280 Pac. 922 (1929). See Kalkanes v. Wille-
stoft, 13 Wn.2d 127, 124 P.2d 219 (1942).
42 Sennett v. Zimmerman, 50 Wn.2d 649, 314 P.2d 414 (1957) ; Coles v. McNamara,
131 Wash. 377, 230 Pac. 430 (1924). But when legality of an arrest is challenged by
a motion to suppress evidence, probable cause is a question of law for the court. State
v. Thornton, 137 Wash. 495, 243 Pac. 12 (1926).
48 Sennett v. Zimmerman, supra note 42.
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tion to be erroneous held that probable cause to believe that a mis-
demeanor was committed in the presence of the officer was justification.
for making an arrest without a warrant. In so holding, the court
distinguished three cases" on the grounds that the officer in those
cases had relied upon information of a third person and not upon his
personal observation, and the conduct of the accused did not give rise
to a belief that the offense was being committed in the presence of the
arresting officer.
It is doubtful whether this distinction will be carried over in the
interpretation of the statute, since it makes no mention of "in the
presence of the arresting officer," although "presence" was required at
common law. Further, the court's statement of policy would seem to
indicate that the officer may arrest under the statute on information
supplied by a third person if he acts reasonably.
To require police officers to be insurers of the correctness of their
judgment would hamper them in the performance of their duties.
Under such circumstances, they would be most reluctant to make any
arrests for fear that they would be held liable for having made an honest
and reasonable mistake.45
Although this was said in connection with what the officer actually
observed, that is, in his presence, it would take very little to stretch
this policy to cover shoplifting cases, particularly since the statute
makes no mention of "in the presence of" and in fact contemplates
the officers' acting on information of a third person.48
The argument that the statute should be strictly construed since it
is penal in nature and in derogation of the common law has had some
of its force removed by the Coles and Sennett line of cases. As will
be remembered, a peace officer at common law was privileged to arrest
44 City of Tacoma v. Houston, 27 Wn2d 215, 177 P.2d 886 (1947) ; State v. Gib-
bons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922); Mitchell v. Hughes, 104 Wash. 231, 176
Pac. 26 (1918).
45 Sennett v. Zimmerman, 50 Wn.2d 649, 651, 314 P.2d 414, 416 (1957).
48 For potential tort liability of an informer see Smith v. Drew, 175 Wash. 11, 26.
P.2d 1040 (1933), which held that one who merely provides information to the officers
and did not direct or assist in arrest could not be liable for the acts of the officer. For
potential liability of private person or corporation for acts of police officer in their
employ see Wheatley v. Washington Jockey Club, 39 Wn2d 163, 234 P.2d 878 (1951),
holding that the employer is not liable when a police officer acts in his public capacity
but is liable when police officer is acting in the performance of his duties for which
he is employed, or his movements are actively directed by the employer. It is a jury
question whether the officer was acting in a public or private capacity. Hayes v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 34 Wn.2d 666, 209 P.2d 468 (1949). A deputized employee, in the
absence of some express limitation of authority, has the same power of arrest as is
conferred upon regular police officers. Sennett v. Zimmerman, 50 Wn.2d 649, 314 P.2d
414 (1957). And, evidently, the same privileges and immunities.
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only if, in fact, the misdemeanor actually had been committed."' Under
the Coles and Sennett cases the Washington court departed from this
common law concept and held that probable cause privileges the arrest.
Thus it could be argued that the "common law" in Washington is
stated in the Sennett case and the statute deviates from that holding
only in respect to the requirement of presence.
In any event, one relying upon the statute must take a calculated
risk until the court has announced its real import.
FELONY ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT
The court in the leading case of State v. Hughlett, s stated the cri-
teria for the arrest without warrant by an officer in felony cases.
But in cases amounting to a felony, if the officer believe, and have good
reason to believe, that a person has committed, or is about to commit,
or is in the act of committing the crime, then he may arrest without a
warrant. But the arresting officer must not only have a real belief of the
guilt of the person about to be arrested, but such belief must be based
upon reasonable grounds. Proper cause for arrest has often been de-
fined to be a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing
the accused to be guilty. An officer may not arrest simply because he
has some fleeting idea that one may be about to commit a felony, but he
must have reasonable grounds for his belief.49
No attempt will be made here to catalog all the cases on probable
cause; those that follow are cited as illustrative of the Washington
court's attitude on the necessary requirements of probable cause.
The mere assertion by a third person that X is wanted in another
county on a felony charge does not constitute probable cause, since
there is "no foundation in fact or sufficient circumstances on which
to rest a belief that the appellant had committed a felony in King
County--or anywhere else.""0  Where, however, the sheriff of one
county obtains a warrant for the arrest of X and requests the police
in another county to detain him, the police have reasonable cause to
believe that a felony has been committed and may arrest, even though
the sheriff did not give the police all the information he had. 1 A
47 1 HARPER & JAMES § 3.18.
48 124 Wash. 366, 214 Pac. 841 (1923).
49 Id. at 368, 214 Pac. at 842-43.
50 Kalkanes v. Willestoft, 13 Wn.2d 127, 130, 124 P.2d 219, 220 (1942).
51 State v. Britton, 137 Wash. 360, 242 Pac. 9 (1926). In State v. Symes, 20 Wash.
484, 488, 55 Pac. 626, 628 (1899), the court approved an instruction that a law officer
is authorized to arrest "...when he has knowledge that a warrant has been issued
upon a charge of felony by proper authority in any county within this state ... "
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sheriff, acting on a letter from a prosecuting attorney, stating that X
was guilty of a felony, had probable cause to arrest.52 Where federal
agents and a county sheriff informed city police that X would receive
illicit liquor from a person arriving on a certain train,' the police who
observed the accused receive a suitcase had probable cause to believe
a felony was in progress."
In State v. Young54 police received a radio call that a robbery had
been committed and that a certain type of automobile was used in
the escape. The police arrested the driver of an automobile answering
the description and found within ten blocks of the scene of the crime
and within a few minutes thereafter. The court held these facts
established probable cause. However, four years previously in an
analogous case, State v. Miles,5" the court held that officers did not
have probable cause to arrest defendants on the bare information that
two young men had committed a robbery. The officers had received
the information by radio call and arrested the defendants, about forty
years old, forty-five minutes later. The court said:
That information would certainly not have been sufficient to justify the
issuance of a search warrant, or a warrant of arrest, had the officers
applied for one. It stands to reason no wider latitude is allowed in
arresting without a warrant, than in securing one.5"
In the Young case the court specifically disclaimed any intent to
abandon Miles, but said the proximity in time and place and the im-
probability that at 3:30 a.m. another such automobile would be in
the vicinity were the distinguishing factors. If Miles stands, the direct
implication is that the requirements for arrest without warrant are
coextensive with the requirements for issuance of a warrant, that is,
circumstances strong enough in themselves to move a dispassionate
magistrate to issue a warrant.
52 Eberhart v. Murphy, 113 Wash. 449, 194 Pac. 415 (1920).
53 State v. Thornton, 137 Wash. 495, 243 Pac. 12 (1926). Accord, Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
54 39 Wn.2d 910, 239 P.2d 858 (1952).
5 State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948). Compare State v. Thompson,
158 Wash. Dec. 602, 364 P.2d 527 (1961).
56 State v. Miles, supra note 55, at 930, 190 P.2d at 745. In this connection it is
interesting to note that the Washington court, following Grau v. United States, 287
U.S. 124 (1932), has held that probable cause to issue a warrant must be based on
evidence competent in a trial before a jury. Pallett v. Thompkins, 10 Wn.2d 697, 118
P.2d 190 (1941) ; Ladd v. Miles, 171 Wash. 44, 17 P.2d 875 (1932) (hearsay). The
Grau holding was rejected in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). More
recently the United States Supreme Court has held a warrant may issue on the basis
of hearsay. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960). The Washington court
has not expressly overruled the Ladd case but it has been rejected on the authority of
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), in State v. Henker, 50 Wn.2d 809,
314 P.2d 645 (1957).
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The officers in Young, said the court, had more than a suspicion
(suspicion denotes a lack of facts or evidence) but had "reasonable
grounds... sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man
in believing the accused to be guilty of the reported felony." 7 This,
of course, does not state a reason but a conclusion to fit the formula
of the Hughlett case.
Where police had knowledge that the accused had attempted to
"utter and pass spurious paper" and then observed him attempt to
negotiate the same, they were held to have probable cause." Likewise,
when a complaining witness informed the police that the accused were
operating a bunco game and the police arrested upon a pre-arranged
signal given by the complaining witness, probable cause existed."
The court has been consistent in stating the test of probable cause as
announced in Hughlett, but has sometimes been inclined to interpret
facts to fit the test.80
An officer in making an arrest can only use that degree of force
reasonably necessary to effect the arrest. An officer may not act
wantonly or oppressively and is not justified in using deadly force if
the person sought to be arrested attempts to escape, when the offense
is a misdemeanor.61 On the other hand, every man has the right to
avoid illegal arrest by flight and by so doing does not subject himself
to arrest as a fugitive. 2 A person may use reasonable force to resist
arrest but the force must be proportionate to the injury attempted by
the arresting party. If the person resisting illegal arrest uses excessive
force he may be arrested for assault.6"
SEARCH AND SEIzuRE
Washington follows what has been denominated as the "federal
exclusionary rule."64 If the arrest is unlawful, any search incidental
to the arrest is unlawful. Evidence obtained by unlawful search may
be excluded by a timely motion to suppress.65 This is required by the
57 State v. Young, 39 Wn.2d 910, 918, 239 P.2d 858, 863 (1952).
58 State v. Lindsey, 192 Wash. 356, 73 P.2d 738 (1937).
69 State v. Mason, 41 Wn.2d 746, 252 P.2d 298 (1953).
60 See, e.g., Plancich v. Williamson, 157 Wash. Dec. 265, 357 P.2d 693 (1960). But
compare Plancich with Ulvestad v. Dolphin, 152 Wash. 580, 278 Pac. 681 (1929)
(drunk in own home).61 Coldeen v. Reid, 107 Wash. 508, 182 Pac. 599 (1919).
62 State v. Rousseau, 40 Wn.2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 (1952).
63 Ibid.
64 See, e.g., State v. Rousseau, 40 Wn.2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 (1952). See also FED.
R. CRIM. P. 41(e).




fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution as well.
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of
exclusion as is used against the Federal Government."6" The right is
"implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty' and as such is enforceable
against the states through the due process clause." Due process is
denied by a state court's refusal to exclude evidence obtained by state
officers in violation of fourth amendment standards." Thus the general
rule that a search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest is tem-
pered by this exclusionary rule which precludes the state from profiting
from lawless law enforcement.
Illegally obtained evidence may be excluded by court order pursuant
to a timely motion to suppress. Generally, a motion to suppress is timely
only if made prior to trial68 because the court is not bound, at the trial,
to try collateral issues." However, if it appears on direct or cross ex-
amination of the state's witness that articles were obtained unlawfully
it is the duty of the trial court to exclude upon motion. " If the defend-
ant had no opportunity to gain knowledge of the illegality of the arrest
and subsequent search, the court should stop the proceedings and
determine the collateral issues.71 In view of these rules and the fact
that discovery is now only partially available in criminal proceedings,"2
it would be tactically wise for an attorney, who is called in to defend
shortly before trial or at trial, to move for a continuance in order to
obtain time to ascertain all the facts surrounding the arrest. If the
initial arrest were unlawful-a question of law for the court 7 -- the
state's case may vanish for lack of competent evidence, and the infor-
mation may be dismissed. It must be borne in mind that the original
66 Mapp v. Ohio, 81 Sup.Ct. 1684, 1691 (1961).
67 Ibid. The rule of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) has long been under
attack. See dissent in Ohio ex. reL. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960). It has now
been overruled by the Mapp case, supra note 66.
68 State v. Miles, 29 Wn2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948) ; State v. Gunkel, 188 Wash.
528, 63 P.2d 376 (1936) ; State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455, 209 Pac. 837 (1922). But
the court need not pass on the motion when made but may postpone action until the
trial. The trial court will not be reversed for exercising its discretion to postpone
unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Green, 43 Wn2d 102, 260 P.2d
343 (1953).
69 State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455, 209 Pac. 837 (1922).
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid. State ex. rel. Fong v. Superior Court, 29 Wn2d 601, 188 P2d 125 (1948)
suggests that certiorari is available if the motion to suppress is denied.
72 See RCW 10.37.030; State v. Thompson, 54 Wn.2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959),
noted 35 WAsr. L. Rav. 168; State v. Olson, 54 Wn.2d 272, 340 P.2d 171 (1959).
73 State v. Thornton, 137 Wash. 495, 243 Pac. 12 (1926).
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arrest is the crux of the matter; if illegal, the evidence will be excluded.
Generally, arrest and search are not made legal by virtue of what the
search subsequently reveals; "in law it is good or bad when it starts
and does not change character from its success."7 Not only is physical
evidence excluded if the arrest was illegal, but the arresting officers
will not be permitted to testify as to what they heard or observed."
A key question often is: How broad a search does the word "inci-
dental" legally authorize? In the Washington context, "incidental"
does not carry with it the usual denotation of "dependent on, or apper-
taining to, another thing (the principal); directly and immediately
pertaining to, or involved in something else, though not an essential
part of it."76 In a recent case, State v. Brooks,7 7 the Washington court
held that a search prior to arrest may be considered "incidental thereto"
where sufficient grounds for lawful arrest did exist before the search
and seizure was made. In that case officers saw an illegally parked
car and while questioning its occupants the officers noticed some un-
cuffed pants in bags in plain view. The clothing was pulled from the
bags which contained four men's suits with the price tags still attached.
When questioned, the defendant denied knowledge or ownership of
the car and clothing; 7 the officers placed him under arrest and booked
him on suspicion of burglary and larceny.
The court held that the officer had "sufficient cause to believe a
felony had been or was being committed by the appellant."8 This
illustrates the liberality with which the court views "probable cause."
It is difficult to imagine how one can reach the conclusion that a felony
74 State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921, 931, 190 P.2d 740, 745 (1948), quoting United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). But cf. State v. Britton, 137 Wash. 360, 365, 242 Pac.
377 (1926) where officers had knowledge of a burglary and were requested to detain
and search X: "any irregularity in the manner of his arrest and detention was cured
when evidence of his connection with the crime was discovered in his effects and his
arrest became legal." The quoted material appears to be unnecessary since the sheriff
of L county had requested that X be arrested for a burglary committed in L county,
which was, as the court held, probable cause. See also State v. Much, 156 Wash. 403,
287 Pac. 57 (1930) ; State v. Symes, 20 Wash. 484, 55 Pac. 626 (1899).
75 State v. Miles, note 74 supra; City of Tacoma v. Houston, 27 Wn.2d 215, 177
P.2d 886 (1947).
76WEBSTER, NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 421 (1957). "[I1ncident to does not
mean: 'Coincidentally with, or aiding the course of, an arrest'." State v. McCollum,
17 Wn.2d 85, 90, 136 P.2d 165, 167 (1943).
77 157 Wash. Dec. 320, 357 P.2d 735 (1960). See also State v. Krantz, 24 Wn.2d
350, 164 P.2d 453 (1945).
78 Compare Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
79 Some Washington cases support the proposition that by denying ownership of
the car or the goods the defendant cannot contend his constitutional rights have been
violated by search of the car or the introduction of evidence found therein. State v.
Vennir, 159 Wash. 58, 291 Pac. 1098 (1930). This is of doubtful validity in light of
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) discussed infra at note 115.80 State v. Brooks, 157 Wash. Dec. 320, 322, 357 P.2d 735, 736 (1960).
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is being committed from the singular fact of seeing a bag of clothes
with uncuffed pants exposed. This perhaps may be viewed as judicial
recognition of clairvoyant powers possessed only by policemen and
judges.
The case could possibly have been resolved on the rationale of the
Deitz81 case, which allows an officer to arrest for a misdemeanor not
amounting to a breach of the peace. The officers could have arrested
for the misdemeanor (illegal parking) and then searched. This ap-
proach however would raise the question of the proper area of search.
Yet, it is not beyond the realm of possibility and illustrates the import
of the Washington deviation from the common law standards regarding
the law of arrest. That is, if the arrest for the misdemeanor was valid,
so would be the search; the "property seized either under a valid
search warrant or as incident to lawful arrest may be used in the
prosecution of a suspected person for a crime other than the one for
which he was arrested, or for which a search warrant was issued.""s
Some Washington cases have provided police officers with tools which
allow searches of individuals suspected of crime although the police
seemingly do not have the requisite probable cause to obtain a search
warrant or warrant of arrest.8" To circumvent fourth amendment
standards,"' under these cases the police need only keep the suspect
under surveillance until he commits a misdemeanor; arrest him for that
violation, and then search him in hopes of obtaining sufficient evidence
upon which to base a conviction for the "real" crime. This technique
is particularly effective where the crime is one of illegal possession,
such as in narcotics cases.8 5 It is very difficult to establish probable
cause to believe that one is in possession of illicit goods, such as nar-
cotics, because their compact nature permits concealment on the person
so as to not arouse suspicion. The present case law plus statutes such
as the vagrancy law6 give the police a powerful and potentially danger-
ous search weapon, limited only by their imagination, good sense and
judicial conscience.
81 State v. Deitz, 136 Wash. 228, 239 Pac. 386 (1925).
82 State ex rel. Fong v. Superior Court, 29 Wn2d 601, 609, 188 P.2d 125, 129
(1948).
83 See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 157 Wash. Dec. 320, 357 P.2d 735 (1960).
84 The Washington court has equated article 1, section 7 of the Washington Con-
stitution with the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. State v.
Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922). The court, however, has expressed
reluctance to go as far as the federal courts in suppressing evidence. State v. Vennir,
159 Wash. 58, 291 Pac. 1098 (1930).
85 See RCW 69.32.080; 69.33.430 (Search and seizure-warrant return).
86RCW 9.87. See particularly 9.87.010(8), (12)-(14). See State v. Dillon, 155
Wash. 486, 284 Pac. 1016 (1930).
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Area o1 Search. A search incidental to a lawful arrest may be made
of the person of the accused. Items of personal effects obtained by the
search which bear on the crime for which he was arrested or on any
other crime may be introduced into evidence against him.88 The court
has reasoned that if an accused's person may be searched, so may the
bags he is carrying and also the automobile of which he had control
and possession at the time of his arrest.8" The right to search a suspect's
automobile was extended in State v. Cyr9" to automobiles within a
reasonably close proximity to the arrested person at the time of arrest.
If the accused is arrested in his home, it too may be searched."'
Some very broad dicta in State v. Evans92 forewarned of extreme
possibilities if the court should apply Cyr type reasoning when an
accused is arrested away from his home. In the Evans case officers
lawfully arrested the defendant while he was on his way back to his
hotel room. The officers searched his room and found some incrim-
inating evidence. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
motion to suppress the evidence on the theory that the defendant had
consented to the search. In dicta, however, the court said that even in
absence of the consent the search would have been lawful. The court
reasoned that the room could have been searched had the defendant
been arrested there and "the fact that he was caught before he reached
the place ought not to require the application of a different rule."9
The extreme possibility became a reality in State v. McCollum94 where
the defendant was arrested while in a hospital and officers without a
search warrant searched his house for evidence. The court approved
this conduct by relying on Evans for construing "incident to arrest"
as not requiring that the arrest and search be "coincidental." This
decision, if followed to its conclusion would dispense with search war-
rants after an accused has been arrested. The exception to requiring
a search warrant will have swallowed the rule.
Further problems arise with respect to illegal search prior to arrest.5
87 See, e.g., State v. Deitz, 136 Wash. 228, 239 Pac. 386 (1925).
88 State ex rel. Fong v. Superior Court, 29 Wn.2d 601, 188 P.2d 125 (1948).
89 State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 Pac. 841 (1923).
9040 Wn.2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952).
91 State v. Evans, 145 Wash. 4, 258 Pac. 845 (1927).9 2 Ibid.
93 Id. at 13, 258 Pac. at 849.
94 17 Wn.2d 85, 136 P.2d 165 (1943). See also State v. Green, 43 Wn.2d 102, 260
P.2d 343 (1953) ; State v. Beaupre, 149 Wash. 675, 271 Pac. 26 (1928).
95 This situation should be distinguished from that of State v. Brooks in which
the search was held valid where officers had grounds for the arrest prior to the search
but did not arrest until after the search. In the situation now under discussion the
search was conducted either in the absence of the suspect or prior to the time when
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State v. Buckley"8 and State v. Thomas"7 involve similar fact patterns
but reach contrary results. In Buckley officers investigating a com-
plaint that a burglary had been committed in an apartment house went
to the room of another tenant, entered without invitation and searched
the room in the presence of the tenant. The search produced items
which fitted the description of stolen articles; arrest followed. Upon
the conviction of the defendant, the trial court realized it had erred in
denying defendant's motion to suppress and granted a new trial; the
supreme court affirmed. In Thomas police officers followed the trail
of unartful felons to the room which they had rented. The officers
looked over the transom and seeing the room unoccupied, entered and
found a revolver and some clothing. They left the room intact and
waited for the return of the occupants. Upon their return the officers
arrested them and "found" incriminating evidence at the time of the
arrest. The court disregarded the search prior to arrest and looked
only to conduct subsequent to the arrest which they found lawful.
This was done on the authority of State v. Evans.
In Buckley the court cited Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States 8 which seemingly would set the standard for jurisdictions fol-
lowing the exclusionary rule.
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the court, but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does
not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred or inaccessible. If
knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be
proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the government's
own wrong cannot use it in the way proposed. 9 (Emphasis added.)
It would thus appear that Thomas is clearly wrong, both on the
basis of precedent of the earlier Buckley case and on the philosophy
of the exclusionary rule, that is, the state should not benefit from its
own wrong.
Scope of Search. A consideration of overriding importance, after
granting that search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, is the
allowable extent and scope of the search made. Should the fact of
lawful arrest privilege officers to make a broad search beyond that
the officers had reasonable cause to believe an accused was in any way involved with
the crime.
96145 Wash. 87, 258 Pac. 1930 (1927).
9 183 Wash. 643, 49 P2d 28 (1935).
08 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
01 Id. at 392.
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which would be allowed under a search warrant issued by a magistrate?
If one were to look to the philosophy underlying search incident to
arrest, the answer perhaps would be an easy one. It has been argued
that search incident to arrest is authorized (1) to protect the arresting
officer and to deprive the prisoner of potential means of escape; and
(2) to avoid destruction of evidence.' From this it is asserted that
the officer may seize anything within the prisoner's control: "What a
farce it makes of the whole Fourth Amendment to say that because for
many legal purposes everything in a man's house is under his control
therefore his house-his rooms-may be searched.'. This argument
did not convince the Court and the result has been to create two lines
of cases on the scope of search on the federal level.
One line is represented by Abel v. United States,' Harris v. United
States, °3 and United States v. Rabinowitz.' They allow a broad and
painstaking search of the entire premises occupied by the suspect at
the time of his arrest. Under Abel, the arrest upon which the search
is predicated need not be for violation of a criminal law or on facts
indicating probable cause but may be an administrative arrest. 5 Any
evidence turned up will be usable against the arrested person whether
it bears upon the violation for which he was arrested or not.'0
Prior to these cases, United States v. Lejkowitz0 7 and Go-Bart Im-
porting Co. v. United States... held that the fourth amendment would
only permit a search-incidental to a lawful arrest-of the person and
articles usable, accessible and in his personal custody.
It is interesting to note that the Abel line of cases would permit a
search broader than that allowed under a search warrant. With a search
warrant, an officer may seize only what the search warrant describes.'
Under Abel, however, an officer may seize, without prior judicial ap-
proval all evidence of commission of any crime.
The Washington cases, although prior in time, would seem to "fol-
low" the broad search approach"0 and are in accord with the rule that
any evidence bearing on any crime discovered during the search will
100 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
101 Id. at 72.
102362 U.S. 217 (1960).
103331 U.S. 145 (1947).
104339 U.S. 56 (1950).
105 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
106 Ibid.
107285 U.S. 452 (1932).
108 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
2o9 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
110 State v. Much, 156 Wash. 403, 287 Pac. 57 (1930).
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be admissible against the arrested person."' As was indicated above" 2
dicta in one case indicated search would be permitted of the accused's
apartment if he were returning to it. This is far beyond even the
broadest Supreme Court decision and seems patently wrong and vio-
lative of the spirit if not the letter of the constitutional prohibitions
of unreasonable search.
Standing to Raise the Issue. The Washington court has attached an
extreme significance to ownership of the article seized beyond that
warranted by law or reason. In one case" 3 officers searched for a mur-
der weapon in the garden outside appellant's home prior to his arrest.
The appellant's motion to suppress was denied, and the supreme court
affirmed on three grounds, all of which seem doubtful in principle.
In the first place, appellant in his affidavits did not aver, had, and could
show, no ownership with possessive rights to any of these articles ...
without which he could assert no constitutional right thereto."14 (Em-
phasis added.)
On this reasoning the police could search any house or person with
impunity if the article seized was not owned with possessive right by
the person searched." 5 That this is contrary to the mandate "no person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law""' seems clear beyond argument. The proper rule is
stated by Jones v. United States:" "Anyone legitimately on premises
where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion
to suppress... ,."I"
The other alternative grounds for denying the motion to suppress
were that (1) there was no statute "conferring jurisdiction on any
magistrate to issue search warrants, the subject-matter of which is the
evidence or instrument of murder"; "1 and that (2) only unreasonable
searches without probable cause are forbidden. Under (1) above, the
court, by implication, would have us believe that officers are authorized
to search whenever there is no statute under which they could obtain
a warrant-a totally novel and frightening thesis. Under (2), to state
"'1 State ex rel. Fong v. Superior Court, 29 Wn.2d 601, 188 P.2d 125 (1948).
112 See discussion accompanying note 88 supra.
13 State v. Much, 156 Wash. 403, 287 Pac. 57 (1930).
14 Id. at 411, 287 Pac. at 60.
115 To the same effect see State v. Vennir, 159 Wash. 58, 291 Pac. 1098 (1930)
holding that the defendant could not assert abridgement of his constitutional rights if
he denied ownership or knowledge of car or liquor found therein.116 WASH. CoNsT. art. 1, § 7.117362 U.S. 257 (1960). Cf. FED. R. CPam. P. 41(e).
11 Id. at 267.
119 State v. Much, 156 Wash. 403, 411, 287 Pac. 57, 60 (1930).
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that only unreasonable searches are forbidden is to assume the con-
clusion that the search was reasonable. The philosophy behind the
federal and state constitutional right to privacy safeguards is that all
searches, whether without warrant or not incidental to lawful arrest,
are unreasonable, notwithstanding the presence or absence of a statute
detailing how warrants are to be issued in specific cases. The state
constitutional provision quoted above---"without authority of law"
contemplates the issuance of a warrant by a disinterested magistrate
upon a showing of probable cause or, at the very least, a search in-
cidental to lawful arrest. Anything else would be unreasonable and
therefore contrary to the Washington Constitution. The privilege of
officers to arrest upon probable cause for misdemeanors not amounting
to breach of the peace is an effective tool to ferret out suspected felons
when arresting for misdemeanors, but the price for this police efficiency
is paid from the ever-diminishing treasury of individual liberty.
If the Washington court follows the Abel case and holds that any
arrest-even an administrative arrest-when validly made would
justify a broad search, the requirement of search warrants will become
extinct. For if the police, with their modern surveillance techniques
are unable to catch their suspect in a misdemeanor, they need only
solicit the cooperation of an administrative agency-as was done in
the Abel case-and obtain the evidence they need. Through coopera-
tion with the health or building inspector, the police have an effective
weapon with which to gain enough evidence to make an arrest.' In
any event, if the arrest could not be effected when the administrative
agent inspected the house or business of the suspect, sufficient informa-
tion could be gained to obtain a search warrant, which would probably
be the last resort when so many easier paths are now open.
ROBERT D. DUGGAN
120 The Abel case and Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) combined, seem to
provide a search and arrest weapon which is unhampered by the fourth amendment.
In Frank, the court upheld a Baltimore ordinance which permitted the commissioner
of health, whenever he suspected that a nuisance existed in any house, to demand
entry therein in the daytime. If the owner or occupier refused, he forfeited twenty
dollars. With this new found power one can expect a close alliance between the police
and administrative officials. The police can use the administrative officer as a "spy" to
get enough information so that a warrant may issue or merely accompany the official,
as in the Abel case, gain admittance on their "credentials" and do the searching and
arresting themselves.
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